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I. A POLmCAL FUGUE
In this essay, I will consider the consequences of efforts by supra-
national organizations to bring harmony to laws within the territories of
their respective competencies. For that purpose, I will attempt to un-
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ravel a portion of the complex fugue through which we play at the
harmonization of law. This fugue plays in three themes.
The principal theme consists of the endlessly rhythmic thrusting of
the essentializing of law within ever more broadly drawn geographic
territories by compelling all law to "look alike." The other two melo-
dies form two of the great political counter-themes of the late twentieth
century: national and cultural solicitude. The first is the chant for the
preservation of the autonomy and singular character of the domestic
legal systems of traditional national states. These entities, formerly
sovereign and sometimes imperial are now subject to the new suprana-
tional suzerains whose tunes threaten to drown out these former sover-
eigns. The second theme is a haunting ballad to a nostalgic past. This
aria articulates the desire to preserve those aspects of subnational norms
which are both charming and tourist worthy. It is also relentless in
efforts to geld those aspects of subnational norms of its essential and
dangerous vitality.
When played individually, each theme is quite self sufficient. Eu-
rope, especially, has had intimate connection with all three at one time
or another and at one place or another. Modernity, however, has a
penchant for complexity. Europe, and especially Europe as reconstituted
as a European Union, has attempted to make a mellifluous counterpoint
from out of the three themes. Such complexity is beyond us. Sadly,
what has issued from this counterpoint is not harmoniousness, but rath-
er dissonance. Thus is the perversity of complexity. I will try to help us
hear more clearly the cacophony produced by the three voices which,
induced to believing that together they are producing a fine counter-
point, are simultaneously singing from three distinct scores.
This Western concept of harmonization, then, is currently bound up
in three distinct and opposing concepts. Heard accurately, one will be
able to hear this European melodic schizophrenia in the statutory frame-
work of the European Union' as well as in the decisions the European
Court of Justice (ECJ). In the European Union's constitutional context,
these three melodic pulses exist as three separable political concepts.
1. The reference here, of course, is to the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOIaC CoMMUNrrY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. For amend-
ments prior to the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, see TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EuROPEAN COMMuNTrrms (EC Off'l Pub. Off., 1987). The full text of the last amendment
to the EC Treaty, the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, along with the text of the EC Treaty as
amended, can be found at 1992 OJ. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EU TREA-
TY].
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The first is harmonization: the power (as well as the will) to im-
pose law directly' and indirectly through what Europeans term "ap-
proximation."3 This is a power substantially directed by the suprana-
tional entity. The second is subsidiarity: the institutionalization of rules
for situating the power to legislate between federative political units.4
This is a means of shifting power to control the object of law to the
component political units. The third is cultural solicitude: consider here
Article 128's brazen and hyperbolic statement: "[t]he Community shall
contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States."5 This
represents an effort, to date self-consciously limited and benign,6 to
erect a limitation on those objects of culture on which the law of the
supranational entity or the nation-state may act.
Especially since the end of the Second World War, it has become
quite fashionable in the Western World to simultaneously promote
harmonization, subsidiarity and the protection of minority cultures. This
trio of norm goals has assumed significance because of the dominance
of the Western world, and its notions of right and wrong, within the
international community. At the same time, it has become quite fash-
ionable outside the Anglo-European world to preach the opposite.7 For
2. In the E.U., for example, the Community has power over the free movement of goods,
see EC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 12-37, including agricultural goods, see EC TREATY arts.
38-47; persons, services and capital, see EC TREATY arts. 48-73(h); the regulation of transport,
see EC TREATY arts. 74-84; and competition, see EC TREATY arts. 85-95.
3. Article 100 of the EC Treaty as originally enacted contained the impetus for vesting in
the Community institutions the power to approximate the laws of the Member States for the
purpose of fulfilling the "mission" of the Common Market. That approximation function has
been expanded considerably by the addition of Article 100(a) in the Single European Act, Feb.
28, 1986. For the text of the Single European Act, see TREATmS ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNInIE, supra note 1.
4. On subsidiarity generally, see George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Fed-
eralism in the European Community and the United States, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994);
A.G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1053 (1992).
5. EU TREATY, supra note 1, art. 128.
6. European governments have resisted even the addition of a protocol to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], covering minority or cultural rights.
7. These are also described in Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights:
Reflections on an East West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641, 644-45, 660-667 (1996). These
sentiments were made crystal clear in recent statements from intellectuals and politicians in
Japan and Singapore. See MAHtATH MOHAMMAD & SHINTARO ISHWHARA, THE VOICE OF
AsIA: Two LEADERS Discuss THE COMNG CENTURY (1996). Thus, for example, Mr. Ishihara
notes: "Asians know we can have the baby of affluence without the bath water of Western
values. In any case, Western arrogance no longer plays in Asia." Id. at 107. Mr. Mahathir is the
Prime minister of Malaysia and Mr. Ishihara was a long time member of the Japanese Parlia-
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non-Westerners is evoked the far simpler provisions of closed funda-
mentalist systems with a limited prejudiced tolerance for marginally
different groups, and no tolerance for others!
The European Union itself has illustrated this complex and perverse
fugue in the recent case of P. v. S & Cornwall County Council." There,
the ECJ extended the European Union's protection against sex discrimi-
nation to transsexuals. "Human rights" was the object of the law of that
case. But the case implicates two other struggles as well. The first
subtextual struggle involved the power to impose a grammar on the
object of law (human rights) by a supranational entity (the ECJ). The
second involved the power of the nation-state and "culture" to resist
both the grammar and object of law as drawn by the centralizing entity.
I will briefly describe the three foci of power distribution and their
rationales. My purpose is to critically examine the tensions and
oppositions within the drive to establish a singular multinational order.
In particular, I interrogate the way in which the politics of choosing one
form of order from among the many has important consequences of the
choices made. In an effort to reconcile oppositions and reduce tensions,
we have made political choices which have produced potentially per-
verse political systems. The perversities of our systems will persist as
ment. Arguably conservative and marginalizable on that score by some, they do represent sig-
nificant currents of non-Western thought in a world order in which most cultures have been
forced to accept the Euro-American fundamental rules of the game. Not that many in the West,
liberal or conservative, view this as a bad thing. Quite the opposite as I show below. See infra
text accompanying note 77. See also Reza Afshari, An Essay on Scholarship, Human Rights
and State Legitimacy: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran 18 HuM. RTs. Q. 544 (1996)
(arguing that academic interaction with states such as Iran marginalizes considerations of human
rights: "human rights discourse can ... offer basic principles that individuals should observe in
their interactions with the institutions of a delinquent state ... (and] academics ... have a
responsibility to ensure that their interactions and research do not.., offer legitimacy to those
who rule by violent means." Id. at 547.).
8. Consider the persecution of Christians in the Sudan and Pakistan, for among other
things, blasphemy. See, e.g., Tom Carter, Many Christians Face Eternal Struggle: Persecution
Worsens as West Watches, WASH. TIMES Sept. 30, 1996, at A16. The recent intellectual and
political revolution in Afghanistan is a case in point. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Afghans Draw
U.N. Warning Over Sex Bias, N.Y. Tmim Oct. 8. 1996, at Al. Crossette discusses the imposi-
tion of strict dress codes for women and the barring of women from work or school outside the
home. For its trouble, the Afghanis have been threatened by the U.N. with the loss of aid. The
author notes, however, that the U.N. has turned a blind eye to discrimination against women in
other muslim majority nations, and that some nations, such as China, do not recognize the re-
gime of international human rights standards at all. For a thoughtful journalistic summary of the
tensions generated by Islam's wrestling with its law, see Elaine Sciolino, The World: The Many
Faces of Islam, N.Y. TrMEs, Oct. 13, 1996, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (describing the extreme
range of interpretive possibility within Islam).
9. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996).
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long as they remain animated by a simultaneous desire to harmonize
the social, legal, cultural and economic structure of the supranational
unit while preserving autonomous national and subnational systems. I
examine these imperatives and perversities as they are manifested in
Cornwall County Council. I end with a discussion of the obligatory
consequences of systems built upon conflicting systems of power distri-
bution. I do not mean to imply that the global human rights enterprise
is wrongheaded or a mistake." However, the Western world has had a
habit of advancing multiple agendas simultaneously. I wish to highlight
the contradictions of that thoughtless approach to constructing a global
framework of moral/legal principles.
II. POWER DISTRIBUTIONS AND RATIONALES
A. Harmonization
All groups serve integrative purposes. The nation-state serves as
the territory within which those under its power are expected to con-
form their behavior to the same standard. Supranational organizations
also serve this purpose. This was made explicit in the U.S. Federal
Constitution over two hundred years ago." As in the United States, the
fundamental purpose of the European Union is harmonization at a level
above that of the traditional national state. 2 Indeed one Can think of
the sole overriding purpose of the European Union as harmonization
within its areas of competence. It is meant to integrate, to consoli-
date... e pluribus unum.
Having so presumptuously stated the case for harmonization, I will
retreat a bit and explain. The integrative powers I so lavishly described
are not absolute. In both the United States and the European Union, the
ceding of integrative power is limited. In the case of the European
10. Thus, I do not believe we should give up on "human rights foundationalism." Contrast
Richard Rorty, Truth and Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy, 16 CRITIcAL INQUIRY 633,
638 (1990). On the other hand, we should be quite conscious about what we do when we en-
gage in the hegemonic enterprise of universalizing moral principles.
11. Recall the explicit purpose of the American federative enterprise: "in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure Domestic Tranquility... " (emphasis added). U.S.
CONST. preamble. These are meta-concerns, the authority for the establishment of the ground
rules for which necessarily flow up to the supranational entity.
12. "The Community shall have as its task .... to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a
high level of employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality
of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States." EU TREATY,
supra note 1, art. 2.
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Union such limitations are meticulously described. The scope of Euro-
pean integration has grown in spurts over the years. Although Commu-
nity institutions may not assert powers other than those set forth in the
EU Treaty and then only for the purposes there stated, E.U. legislative
and judicial competence has been exercised broadly and with great
flexibility.
Couched in the language of general principles of Community law
which spring, like Athena, fully developed out of the black letter of the
Community Treaties, the quest for harmonization has developed into its
own cottage industry. 3 To identify general principles of community
law as a great engine of supranational harmonization is not to say that
it is bad. Yet the power and direction of this engine may take one
where one might have wanted to go. The rationales of harmonization at
any level, but especially at the level of the supranational entity are well
known: efficiency, clarity, predictability.
The harmonizing effects of general principles of Community law,
as discovered from time to time by the ECJ, increases in significance
when wed to that other great imperial truth of the E.U., the principle of
Community law supremacy. That principle has been declared, at least
by the ECJ."4 The principle has become well established to some ex-
tent, although not without formidable resistance from the interpretive
institutions of the subsidiary political units.' 5 I want to concentrate on
13. See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
Fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125. In Nold v. Commission, Case
4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491, the Court noted that:
Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law ....
In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States .... Similarly, interna-
tional treaties for the protection of human rights on which he Member States
have collaborated, or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines
which should be followed within the framework of Community law.
14. See, e.g., Case 26/62, N.V. Transport v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964
E.C.R. 585. See generally R. Bieber, On the Mutual Completion of Overlapping Legal Systems:
The Case of the European Communities and the National Legal Orders, 13 EuR. L. REv. 147
(1988); J. Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 645 (1990); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of
Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. EuR. L. 276 (1981).
15. "Even though the Court of Justice found that the transfer of Member States powers to
the Community is definite and irreversible, neither the Community legislative practice, nor the
relevant rulings of the Member States' constitutional and supreme courts endorse this Court's
pronouncement" Daniela Obradovic, Repatriation of Powers in the European Community, 34
COMMON MKT L. REv. 59, 88 (1997). On the reluctance of some Member State courts to ac-
cept the supremacy of all community action over Member State constitutional principles, see,
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the expansiveness of harmonization through the assertion of the power
of the European Court of Justice to derive and impose general princi-
ples of Community law. 6
B. Subsidiarity: Protecting the Middleman
The recently incorporated principle of subsidiarity, imposes on the
European federative system a constitutional choice of the political level
at which legislative action must be taken within the European Union."'
Critics of the principle have argued that subsidiarity will give the
Member States, as independent political entities, significant leverage in
negotiating the extent of E.U. actions within the E.U. Council. They
note that an argument can always be made that while an action falls
within the competence of the E.U., the matter has not been shown to be
better achieved by the Community. 8
for example, Berthold Wild & Bernd Joch, The Application of Community Law in Germany, 17
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 509 (1980) and 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 79 (1981); R. Pettriccione,
Supremacy of Community Law Over National Law: Italy, 11 EUR. L. REV. 320 (1986);
Laurence Gormley, The Application of Community Law in the United Kingdom 1976-1985, 23
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 287 (1986); Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional Court and the
Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European Community, 12 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 173 (1990); M. Arpio, Spanish Adaptation to Community Law: 1986-1988, 16 EUR. L. REV.
149 (1991); Henry Schermers, The Scales in Balance: National Constitutional Court v. Court of
Justice, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 97 (1990).
16. On the authority of the judicial organs of the European Union to entertain human rights
issues, see, for example, Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Con-
cerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human
Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986)
(describing the basis of E.U. control over the determination of human rights issues within the
E.U. and the constitutional and statutory bases therefor). Hajalte Rasmussen has argued that the
EJC's activism in matters of culture and politics is democratic to the extent it reflects the will
of the people better than the representatives of the Member States within the institutions of the
Community. See HAiALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND PoLIcY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JusTICE 101-102 (1986).
17. As set forth in the EC Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity provides a limitation of the
competence of the institutions of the European Union:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
EU TRFATY, supra note 1, art. 3(b).
18. See STEPHEN WFATHERIL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 170
(1995). Note, though, that subsidiarity, as a formal matter, is only relevant in the areas of
shared competence between Member States and the Community. In areas of exclusive Commu-
nity competence, it has no role to play. Of course, the Treaty is singularly unhelpful in defining
areas of exclusive and joint competence. One can argue (broadly) that any area covered by the
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
The United States has no equivalent principle of deference to its
constituent states. We rely on politics. 9 And yet politics can be very
effective. Consider the subsidiarity issues within the Contract with
America ° on which the Republican party rode to political domination
in the legislative branch of the federal government in the 1994 elec-
tions.
C. Protection of Group Culture: Sanctioned Rebelliousness
Protection of group culture is today relatively meaningless as a
political concept. Yet, it stands potentially, like the principle of
subsidiarity, against the expansiveness of harmonization not only at the
level of the Community itself,2 but also at the level of the Member
State.' "The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe be-
lieves that defining the rights of national minorities and providing an
effective guarantee of such rights at an international level is one of the
main ways of defusing ethnic conflicts and establishing peace in Eu-
rope. '2
EC Treaty would be exclusively within Community competence. The only exceptions would be
in those areas where the EC Treaty expressly give the Member States a role to play (for exam-
ple, Article 129 and vocational training; Article 128 and cultural solicitude). Conversely, areas
of exclusive Community competence might be defined as limited to those areas in which the
Member States are expressly forbidden to legislate. For a discussion of these issues, see, for
example, Bermann, supra note 4, at 344-47.
19. For a discussion of the way in which the choice of the best site for legislation within
the U.S. federal system is made, see Bermann, supra note 4.
20. REPuBLICAN NATIONAL CoMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY
REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HousE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE
NATION (1994).
21. EC Treaty Article 128, itself, requires the Community to "take cultural aspects into ac-
count in its action under other provisions of [the EC] Treaty." EU TREATY, supra note 1, art.
128(4).
22. EC Treaty Article 128 makes clear that the objective of cultural solicitude stands in
opposition to harmonization, and is yet not the equivalent of subsidiarity. In compelling the
Council to adopt incentive measures for the promotion of culture, Article 128 specifically for-
bids to the Council measures which would result in "harmonization of the laws and regulations
of the Member States." EU TREATY, supra note 1, art. 128(5). Protection of national and
subnational cultural norms has also become something of a cottage industry in European in-
ternational law. Consider the flowing of international law which touches on these concerns:
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (1966); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1979); Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities,
in FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES AND ExPLANA-
TORY REPORT (Council of Europe publication 1995); European Cultural Convention, 218
U.N.T.S. 139 (1955); and European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (Strasbourg,
Nov. 5, 1992, Eur. Treaty Ser. No. 148).
23. Statement of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The Protection of
[Vol. 4:185
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Yet here also is vested the possibilities of self-determination at a
social, cultural or economic level. This possibility exists whether or not
the outcome is formal political independence or autonomy.24 In the
E.U., the Member States have sought to bottle the genie of self-determi-
nation within strict confines. 2 No supranational unit and scarcely any
nation-state would currently countenance the de jure creation of col-
lective rights based on cultural "identity." Thus, for example, in draft-
ing the framework convention for the protection of minority rights, the
Committee of Ministers resisted any suggestion that protection of mi-
nority rights would create extranational collective rights. "Nevertheless,
parties recognise that a national minority can be protected through
protection of the rights of individuals belonging to the minority."'
Still, I suspect that the "culture clause" of the EC Treaty will
quickly escape its borders and become as potent a force as subsidiarity
and harmonization.' I also wonder about the harmlessness of a con-
National Minorities (undated), available at http:/Istars.coe.frlgenlaintro7.htm.
24. Indeed, self-determination has been hailed as the "new constitutive dynamic of the
world community .... Of the many consequences of this historical, contemporary, and col-
lective process is a new global skepticism about the adequacy of the national state, especially in
matters of justice, rights, economic equity, and representative government, plus its ability to
control its own markets and control sources of environmental degradation within its borders."
Henry J. Richardson, IlI, "Failed States," Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colo-
nialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectation, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1996). This
notion is taken up in MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER 46-52 (1992).
25. Thus, for example, Article 128 specifically excludes the power of harmonization at the
Community Institution level. And even with respect to the measures permitted under Article
128, primarily incentive measures, Article 128 imposes a unanimity requirement for E.C.
Council actions. See EU TREATY, supra note 1, art. 128.
26. Statement of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The Protection of
National Minorities (undated), available at http://stars.coe.fr/gen/aintro7.htm.
27. Accord STEPHEN WEATRERiLt, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 173-
174 (1995). Professor Weatherill correctly, I think, notes that activity covered ostensibly by
Article 128 might well leak into the harmonization regimes of Article 100 through the "neces-
sary and proper" provisions of Article 235 as a means of circumventing the unavailability of
law making power in Article 128. Article 235 provides that if "action by the Community should
prove necessary to attain... one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not
provided the necessary powers" then the Council acting unanimously may take "the appropriate
measures." It might even be plausible to argue that Article 100(a)'s harmonization authority
(through which legislation may be enacted by qualified majority voting rather than the unanimi-
ty requirements of Articles 100 and 235) might be available as well. I would take Professor
Weatherill one step farther and argue that Article 128 may provide a sort of veto power in cul-
tural groups as against community institutions (by permitting challenges to Community action
or inaction under Articles 173 and 175) and also against Member State action for failure to
comply with Treaty obligations. Further treatment of this possibility is beyond the scope of this
article.
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vention which requires national and supranational entities to prohibit
forced assimilation and to encourage transfrontier and international
cooperation." Certainly this is one of the substratum "morals" of the
Cornwall County Council case.
III. EURO-SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE CORNWALL COUNTY CASE
A. The Cornwall County Council Case in Context
The case involved the employment effects of the gender transfor-
mation odyssey of P, a manager in an educational establishment operat-
ed by the defendant. About a year after P commenced work she in-
formed her employer of her intention to undergo gender reassignment.
This began a "life test" during which P dressed and behaved as a wom-
an. This period was followed by surgery to give P the physical attrib-
utes of a woman.29
At the commencement of the series of surgical procedures, P was
given three months notice and terminated. P brought an action against
defendants in which she claimed she was the victim of sex discrimina-
tion. The defendants asserted that she was the victim of redundancy."
The Industrial Tribunal, before which the action was brought, de-
termined that the gender reassignment was the real cause of the dis-
missal. The Tribunal determined that such a situation was not covered
under the English Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, but was unsure
whether the situation was covered under the sex discrimination directive
issued by the E.U.3" Therefore, the Tribunal referred the question of
the applicability of the directive to the ECJ.32
The ECJ was quite aggressive in highlighting the oppositions with-
in harmonization in a pluralistic world of meta-states, nation-states and
subnational cultural groups. The ECJ noted that the directive in ques-
tion merely expressed that the principle of equality "is one of the fun-
damental principles of Community law."33 The ECJ also noted that
28. Cf. Statement of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The Protection
of National Minorities (undated), available at http://stars.coe.frlgen/aintro7.htm. For example, it
is not clear to me that the day will not come when a culturally identifiable minority will argue
that the imposition of European sex discrimination laws would require it to forcibly assimilate
into an alien culture.
29. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996), at I 3.
30. Id. at ]I 4-5.
31. Council Directive No. 761207/EEC, 1976 OJ. (L 39) 40. For a discussion of that direc-
tive, see generally SACHA PREcHAL & NOREEN BURROWs, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 104-164 (1990).
32. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, at 9lR 7-9.
33. Id. at( 19.
[Vol. 4:185
19971 HARMONIZATION, SUBSIDIARITY AND CULTURE 195
"the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex is one of
the fundamental human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to
ensure. 
3 4
On that basis, the Court read the directive broadly to cover the
cause of P's dismissal. "To tolerate such discrimination would be tanta-
mount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and
freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty
to safeguard."3 The decision provides an important insight into the
intersections and oppositions of harmonization, subsidiarity and cultural
solicitude within a supranational system. We explore these next.
B. The Oppositions Revealed
The Cornwall County Council decision was neither a run-of-the-
mill or straightforward application of the E.U.'s equal treatment direc-
tive. The ECJ was well aware that "in Community law there is no
precise provision specifically and literally intended to regulate the prob-
lem."36 It is quite likely that the ECJ was well aware that it was mak-
ing a major pronouncement in a "big" case. Certainly, advocate general
Tesauro expressed the desire that the ECJ use this case to force most of
the Member States "forward" in accordance with advanced Western
European notions of "progress" (and no other).37
The question thus quite consciously involved the manner in which
the voices of harmony, subsidiarity and cultural solicitude would be
allowed expressive freedom. The ECJ chose to base its decision on the
widest possible basis of decision, the invocation and application of
general principles of Community law. As such, the ECJ deliberately
invoked the rules of the normative substructure of the Community to
bind the Member States and subnational cultures by reading the result
into the organic constitution of the group. Cornwall County Council
stresses the essential point of the resolution of the oppositionality of
harmony, subsidiarity and cultural solicitude-subgroup autonomy may
be exercised only within the framework created by the supranational
34. Id. at J 20.
35. Id. at [ 23.
36. P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, C-13/94 opinion of advocate general Tesauro
delivered Dec. 14, 1995 (on file with author).
37. Whether the court chose to adopt the advocate general's aggressive stance remains to be
seen. Evidence of their intent will come shortly, when the ECJ decides whether the sex discrim-
ination provisions also apply to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See Lisa Grant
v. South-West Trains, Ltd., Southampton Indust. Tribunal Case No. C-249/96.
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group. This framework limits as well as binds. That it may well sub-
stantially vitiate the core norms of those subgroups is of no moment.
Harmonization. Harmonization is the key to this case. It represents an
exercise, now fairly common to the ECJ, of cobbling together a Europe-
wide norm38 from its interpretation of the constitutional traditions of
the Member States,39 the EC Treaty,'4  and the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms4' Thus for
38. The Treaty on European Union added Article F, which provides in part that:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 December 1950 and as they would result from the con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community Law.
EU TREATY, supra note 1, art. F. However, Article L of the Treaty on European Union does
not explicitly make the provisions of Article F subject to the powers of the ECJ. The ECJ ac-
cepts this notion of the harmonizing role of fundamental norms within the context of its
Cornwall County Council decision. See Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, at
IM 18-22.
39. See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 ("In fact, respect for
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court
of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of
the Community." Id. at 1 4).
40. Thus, for instance, the ECJ has derived a general principle of community law respecting
non-discrimination and equal treatment from out of its sense of the general direction taken by
the EC Treaty with respect to those concepts. Consider Joined Cases 103 & 145/77, Royal
Scholten-Honig (Holdings) Ltd. v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, Tunnel Refin-
cries Ltd. v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (first isoglucose cases), 1978 E.C.R.
2037, 1 C.M.L.R. 675, where the Court, in interpreting EC Treaty Article 40(3) (prohibiting
discrimination between producers and consumers within the Community), explained that the
non-discrimination provision in that article of the EC Treaty "is merely a specific enumeration
of the general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of Community
law." Id. at 1 26. See PREcHAL & BuRRows, supra note 31, at 2-6 (on the development of the
principle of equal treatment within the ECJ and its application to sex and gender discrimination
issues).
41. See Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (noting that the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms supplied guidelines
to be followed within the framework of Community law). See also Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 6. Among other things, the Hu-
man Rights Convention protects the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), and
the freedom to enjoy protected rights without discrimination (Article 14). The enforcement pro-
ceedings can be complex. The Human Rights Convention permits a state to limit protected
rights under a number of circumstances. Article 8 rights may be limited in the interest of public
safety, public order, national security, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the
rights of others, but only if such limitations are "prescribed by law" and "necessary in a demo-
cratic society." Id., art. 8. Article 14, by contrast, supplements the substantive rights accorded
1997] HARMONIZATION, SUBSIDIARITY AND CULTURE 197
example, note the ease with which the ECJ cited to the interpretations
of the European Court of Human Rights in Cornwall County Coun-
cil.42
This is a normalizing harmonization; the ECJ means to impose a
standard of conduct on the citizens of the E.U. which will provide the
basis on which the propriety of conduct will be judged. Yet, as even the
ECJ conceded, the real basis for this social disciplining lies outside the
"black letter" of the EC Treaty itself.43 This is not an unproblematical
enterprise for the Court of Justice, especially where it has asserted the
power to impose conduct norms in the arena of "human rights." In this
context, politics may intervene.' For example, the ECJ has recently
opined that the European Union itself cannot accede to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms absent
an amendment to the EU Treaty itself.4'
Shorn of its sentimentality and rhetoric, Cornwall County Council
is an expression of hegemony at the level of the supranational entity.
by the Human Rights Convention and has no independent existence. See, e.g., N. v. Sweden,
App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203, 206 (1985). Complaints are first
reviewed by the European Commission of Human Rights. Complaints not resolved by that body
are usually (but not always) referred to the European Court of Human Rights. Sometimes com-
plaints may be referred to the Committee of Ministers (although decisions of this body may also
be appealed to the European Court of Human Rights). Decisions of these bodies are usually
(but not always) given specific effect. See Laurence R. Heifer, Note, Finding a Consensus on
Equality: The Homosexual Age of Consent and the European Convention of Human Rights, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1044, 1047-1053 (1990). By March, 1994, all but one of the signatories of the
Human Rights Convention had signed Protocol No. 11 pursuant to which the present system of
enforcement will be replaced by a single permanent court modeled on the European Court of
Justice. See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ludwig, Principal Characteristics of the New
ECHR Control Mechanism as Established by Protocol No. 11, 15 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 81
(1994).
42. Id. at 1 16. For reservations about the harmonizing power of the ECJ in this context,
see Weiler, supra note 14, at 1103.
43. See Weiler, supra note 14, at 1103 (describing the basis of E.U. control over the de-
termination of human rights issues within the E.U. and the constitutional and statutory bases
therefor).
44. On the disciplining of society, see MICrEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BmTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan, trans. 1979) (1975) at 195-228 (on discipline in modem
culture).
45. Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94 (Mar. 28, 1996). Giorgio Gaja has explained
this reticence as a consequence of the politics of power. "what is here at stake is the conserva-
tion by the Court of Justice of its present functions, although understandably the Court has not
stressed this point in order not to emphasize its concern with its own prerogatives." Giorgio
Gaja, Case Law: Court of Justice, Opinion 2194, Accession by the Community to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Given on 28
March 1996, Not Yet Reported, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 973, 988 (1996).
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For the advocate general, this decision was a deliberate, conscious, and
aggressive act.' The actual merits of the determination by the ECJ are
of secondary importance. What makes Cornwall County Council partic-
ularly interesting is its juridical underbelly-the real decision of the
case was the determination that the ECJ retains the authority to deter-
mine the scope of those general principles of Community law which
may be imposed on the Member states and all who reside within them.
In effect, an organ of the supranational entity now reserves to itself the
power to determine the extent of its power to define the conduct pa-
rameters of all subordinate entities. A very neat trick; one which sig-
nificantly increases the power of the E.U. for the purposes of doing
"good things" but also one which permits a substantial intrusion into
the autonomy of the member states. It is now left to the ECJ, within its
self-defined parameters,' to designate the base line and limits within
which (non-dangerous) deviation will be permitted. These powers are
exercised through the Court's power to declare "fundamental principles
of community law."'
That this retention of norm-defining harmonizing power was af-
firmed in the service of an arguably noble cause does not change the
characteristic of the taking. General principles of Community law may
as easily be used by the ECJ in the service of the imposition of less
noble norms in the eyes of national and subnational cultures. Whatever
the nobility of the harmonizing, national and subnational groups are
clearly required to incorporate them as new parts of their respective
cultural landscapes.
Indeed, the problem of Cornwall County Council is that many
people will believe that politically the Court reached the "right" result.
But that is not my focus. Rather, Cornwall County Council teaches us
most not from its doctrinal application of the equal treatment directive,
but from its offhanded acceptance of a hierarchy of lawmaking. What
46. Thus, advocate general Tesauro stated:
Finally, I am well aware that I am asking the Court to make a "courageous"
decision. I am asking it to do so, however, in the profound conviction that
what is at stake is a universal fundamental value, indelibly etched in modem
legal traditions and in the constitutions of the more advanced countries: the
irrelevance of a person's sex with regard to the rules regulating relations in
society.
P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, Case C-13/94 opinion of advocate general Tesauro deliv-
ered Dec. 14, 1995 (on file with author), at 8.
47. See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
48. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247, at 1 18.
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makes "good" cases like Cornwall County Council problematic is the
way in which politically "good" cases highlight the tensions between all
sorts of "good" policies. In this case, a "good" result for transsexuals
highlights the cost-the sacrifice of the "good" policies of subnational
cultural determinism and member state autonomy. These contradictions
are less usefully illustrated in the obvious cases. In such cases, one is
arguably prepared to recognize and act on the contradiction. Moreover,
the motivation for criticism in those cases is usually suspect, since it is
as likely a dissatisfaction with the result as it is with any discomfort
with the structure from which it was produced. In contrast, in subtle
cases one would not tend to look for the contradictions. In cases like
Cornwall County Council, one is freed of the distractions of the merits
to concentrate on the structural basis on which the decision was pro-
duced, and on the nature of the power relationships between national
and supranational entities which permit the acceptance of this structure
of power.
Subsidiarity. The Cornwall County Council case represents a stark
example of the subsidiarity principle's limits as a formalized basis for
the prevention of the erosion of the power of the Member States. Deci-
sions like Cornwall County Council leave no room for
subsidiarity-and no room for the peculiarities of Member State legal
norms. "In so far as the law seeks to regulate relations in society, it
must, on the contrary keep up with social change, and must therefore be
capable of regulating new situations brought to light by social change
and advances in science."'49
Of what use is subsidiarity in the face of the power of the centrali-
ty? The centrality, through its courts, creates the norms which regulate
the internal actions of the Member States themselves. Hence, the meta-
state assumes the role of source of new centralizing power. It must,
49. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, opinion of advocate general
Tesauro, at 4. Of course, assuming one takes a very broad view of the meaning of exclusive
Community competence, then the issue of subsidiarity would be irrelevant in Cornwall County
Council for more technical reasons. If the principle of equality is covered under Article 119 of
the EC Treaty and if the Equal Treatment Directive is grounded in Article 119, then the entire
field of equal treatment is within the exclusive competence of the Community. It would then
follow that the Court would not have to justify its decision in light of the subsidiarity principle.
I owe this insight to Bruce Carolan. But even were this the case, the Court never reached that
issue, or, rather, it leaped over that issue to ground the decision in a broader context, that of the
imperatives of basic European norms under its construction of general principles of equality.
The Court assumes that in the area of general principles of Community law, there is no place
for the Member States (except indirectly as founts of such principles).
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because "[s]ubsidiarity is concerned with the means of furthering [com-
mon] values [shared between central and local institutions] but cannot
provide a way out of fundamental conflicts about the values them-
selves.""0 Values conflicts can only be resolved by the central authori-
ty-and so we introduce the discipline of harmonization and hegemony.
"This is inevitable. In society as it is today, in which customs and
morals are changing rapidly, citizens are guaranteed ever wider and
deeper protection of their freedoms."'" Thus, subsidiarity may well
work against its own interest. Subsidiarity assumes the state is little
more than a mere geo-political entity. This construction of the "state"
might well permit the court to ignore the state in making any cultural
(as opposed to "political") analysis.
Indeed, the evidence is Cornwall County Council itself, where the
court quite consciously assumed the role of centralizing cultural author-
ity. In this way, the Cornwall County Council court provided a strong
indication of the value of the principle of subsidiarity as a source of
protection of Member State autonomy as against the power to declare
general principles of community law. Quite simply, subsidiarity is irrel-
evant in connection with the consideration of the most basic questions
affecting a supranational grouping. The doctrine of subsidiarity, then, is
solicitous of Member State norm-making power only after the suprana-
tional entity has created the fundamental norms under which all rule
making will be interpreted and judged. Once basic choices are made,
subsidiarity is free to come into play. Subsidiarity is a tool of legisla-
tive implementation, not of core legislative formulation.
Contrast the relationship of subsidiarity to general principles of
Community law with that of the margin of appreciation doctrine in
interpreting the ECHR by that "step-sister" court of the European Un-
ion, the European Court of Human Rights. 2 The recent "transsexual
cases" of the European Court of Human Rights suggest the differ-
ence.53 The European Court of Human Rights has expressed the view
50. Nicolas Bernard, The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle
of Subsidiarity, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 633, 651 (1996).
51. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, opinion of advocate general
Tesauro, at 3.
52. On the margin of appreciation generally, see, for example, Pieter van Dijk, The Treat-
ment of Homosexuals Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in HOMosEXuALrrY:
A EUROPEAN COMMuNITY IssuE: ESSAYS ON LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LAW
AND POLICY 179 (1993).
53. See Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1990); Rees v. United King-
dom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986). In Cossey, a person, born male, who underwent gender reas-
signment surgery and lived as a woman, challenged the denial by the United Kingdom of her
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that where there exists "little common ground between the Contracting
States," national entities enjoy "a wide margin of appreciation."54
Thus, "[a]lthough some contracting States would now regard as valid a
marriage between a person in Miss Cossey's situation and a man, the
developments which have occurred to date cannot be said to evidence
any general abandonment of the traditional concepts of marriage.""
Thus, the "margin of appreciation" works as a limiting principle on the
European supranational human rights regime.
Yet, the very lack of nation-state consensus which gives the margin
of appreciation its widest power to limit the interpretive power of the
European Court of Human Rights can sometimes serve as the vehicle to
overcome the domination of that principle. This is especially the case
where consensus, while divided, is interpreted to be changing in a par-
ticular direction.
For example, in the transsexual cases, the consensus gap trans-
formed itself into something problematic when the European Court of
Human Rights became "conscious of the seriousness of the problems
facing transsexuals and the distress they suffer. Since the Convention
always has to be interpreted and applied in the light of current circum-
stances, it is important that the need for appropriate legal measures in
this area should be kept under review."56 "Current circumstances"
analysis permits the European Court of Justice some discretion to bal-
ance the interests of the community and the individual "the search for
which balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention." 7 However,
when the balance tilts in favor of the individual, the margin of appre-
ciation disappears. That was the essence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights's holding in the "homosexual sodomy" cases."8 A con-
request to obtain a birth certificate indicating she was female and the legal restriction on her
ability to marry a man. The European Court of Human Rights held over vigorous dissent that
there had been no violation of either Articles 8 or 12. In Rees, a person, born female, who
underwent medical treatment and lived as a man, challenged the denial by the United Kingdom
of his request to obtain a birth certificate indicating he was male. The European Court of Hu-
man Rights held over vigorous dissent that there had been no violation of either Articles 8 or
12.
54. Cossey, at 641; Rees, at 64.
55. Cossey, at 642 (respecting the Article 12 challenge).
56. Cossey, at 641; Rees at 68.
57. Rees, at 64.
58. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 485 (ser. A) (1981); Norris v. Ire-
land, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993). For a
discussion of the political nature of the determination of the limitations of "human rights" in
this context, see Larry CatA Backer, Inscribing Judicial Preferences into Our Basic Law: Con-
stitutional Interpretation in the Service of the Status Quo (1996) (manuscript, on file with au-
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sensus gap pointing the way to a particular new consensus, of course,
was also what the dissenting judges argued in Cossey.'9
A pronouncement of general principles of community law by the
European Court of Justice is similar to the notions inherent in a deter-
rnination by the European Court of Human Rights that no margin of
appreciation is possible in a particular case. Both implicate the need for
inherent normative consistency in the emerging meta-system of human
rights. This normative consistency is simultaneously superior, and in
opposition, to the meta-systems of self-determination and respect for
cultural (national) difference. It may be that "a cross fertilization pro-
cess is well underway, one that ultimately may lead to more harmoni-
zation of the law in... human rights areas."' Certainly, Cornwall
County Council vividly demonstrates this principle within the European
system of human rights.
Thus, general principles of Community law serve as a limiting
principle for Member State autonomy, even with respect to areas where
the Member State has legislative authority. There is a U.S. equivalent.
It is the enunciation of federal constitutional principles as against the
power of both federal and state political units. General federal constitu-
tional principles supply the interpretative norms with which we under-
thor).
Norris defined the parameters of the newly recognized political reality. Thereafter, the
cases were not hard. In Europe, popular cultural norms, the habits of ordinary European citizens
makes it exceedingly difficult to find particularly serious reasons creating a pressing social need
to criminalize sexual activity between men. Before the Court, the government argued that the
"moral fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own institutions and the Government
should be allowed a degree of tolerance, ... a margin of appreciation that would allow the
democratic legislature to deal with this problem in the manner which it sees best." Id. at I 42.
The Court rejected this argument citing that to make such a determination, "the reality of the
pressing social need must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." Id. at 1 44. The court
rebuffed the Government's attempt to preclude it from review of Ireland's obligation not to
interfere with an Article 8 right when such deals with the interests of the 'protection of morals.'
The Court also noted that serious reasons must exist before government interference can be
legitimate for purposes of Article 8. Once again, citing a portion from Dudgeon regarding the
lack of evidence showing that the non-enforcement of Northern Ireland's relevant law had
been detrimental to the moral standards of its people or that there was public demand for strict-
er enforcement of the law, the Court held that "it cannot be maintained that there is a "pressing
social need" to make such [homosexual] acts criminal offenses. Id. at 46.
59. Cossey, at 648. See dissenting opinion of Judge Martens.
60. Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and Internationally: The
Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 699, 702 (1996) (footnotes
omitted) (arguing for the need for what the author calls the harmonization of international hu-
man rights law). Note, however, that recent voices have begun to sense that there is a "declin-
ing consensus on the role that the system established by the European Convention plays for the
protection of human rights." Gaja, supra note 45, at 989.
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stand our legislation.6' Constitutional principles, like general principles
of Community law, are examples of meta-harmonization-norms which
are meant to limit the range of acceptable subsidiarity. Subgroups are
not permitted to explode the boundaries of these general principles.
This is law making which is impervious to the logic of subsidiarity as a
general principle of comity; it is outside of what Americans conceive of
as issues of federalism. In this sense Cornwall County Council func-
tions much like U.S. federal constitutional cases wrestling with prin-
ciples of interpretation.
Cultural Solicitude. It is at this residual level of power that Cornwall
County Council is at its most interesting. After all, where in the deci-
sion is there exhibited the concern for the idiosyncracies of subnational
cultural norms to which Community Institutions (including, presumably
the ECJ) now ought to show sensitivity? There are none. Such solici-
tude would amount to the kind of obsolescence rejected by the advocate
general in his opinion.6' Indeed, the advocate general's opinion, if
persuasive in future cases, would indicate that cultural resistance to the
normalization of "homosexuality" would also have to be swept aside.
As a result, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would also
violate the principle of equality as described by the advocate general
and in the opinion of the European Court of Justice itself.63
61. For example, consider Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), from the analytical
perspective of the European Union. In Romer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an amendment
to the Colorado state constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitu-
tion. The amendment, through a statewide voter referendum, precluded all legislative, executive
or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of
persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships". Colorado, a Member State of the United States, has the legislative authority to
amend its constitution by popular referendum. However, general principles of Constitutional law
foreclosed the use of that power in ways that violated the harmonizing norms of the principle of
"equal protection." For a discussion of Romer, see Larry CatA Backer, Reflections of the Law of
"Moral and Social Disapprobation" in Romer v. Evans: Conformity and the Political Function
of Courts in the U.S. and U.K. (1996) (manuscript, on file with author).
62. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, opinion of advocate general
Tesauro, Dec. 14, 1995, at 6 (on file with author) ("I regard as obsolete the idea that the law
should take into consideration, and protect, a women who has suffered discrimination in com-
parison with a man, or vice versa, but denies that protection to those who are also discriminated
against, again by reason of sex, merely because they fall outside the traditional mantwoman
classification.").
63. This necessarily follows from the advocate general's argument. Case C-13/94, P. v. S.
and Cornwall County Council, opinion of advocate general Tesauro. The ECJ also implied the
possibility of this extension when it explained that "the scope of the [equal treatment] directive
cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or other
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Indeed, the Cornwall County Council case demonstrates the effec-
tiveness of cultural sensitivity only as a second order concern. Where
the issue touches on matters deemed to involve a fundamental charac-
teristic of the European "character" (the supranational character if you
will), then subnational cultural idiosyncracies may not intrude. "To my
mind, the law cannot cut itself off from society as it actually is, and
must not fail to adjust to it as quickly as possible. Otherwise it risks
imposing outdated views and taking on a static role."' Left in the
wake of this dynamism are the cultural norms which one might other-
wise think should have helped inform the Court's decision.
Cultural solicitude, then, is limited to the margin. Yet perversely,
even the definition of that margin must be a matter of foundational con-
cern. The definition of the margin cannot be left to the idiosyncracies
of the subnational culture and its "conflict of laws" rules. Cultural
solicitude, protection of sub-national minority ethos, is reduced to the
ultimate residuum. This reduction follows from the inherent circularity
of our understanding of what necessary solicitude of culture means.
Advocate general Tesauro is quite clear on this point. What is at
stake here is the concept of social justice and European integration. The
fact that "in Community law there is no precise provision specifically
and literally intended to regulate the problem" should not prevent the
Court from imposing on all subnational cultures a harmonizing concep-
tion of "the great value of equality"'67 an equality derived from "princi-
ples and objectives of Community social law, the statement of reasons
for the directive underlining 'the harmonization of living and working
conditions while maintaining their improvement' and also the case law
of the Court itself, which is ever alert and to the fore in ensuring that
disadvantaged persons are protected."
sex. In any event, we may all find out soon enough. The Southampton Industrial Tribunal made
a reference in July, 1996, seeking a preliminary ruling respecting the applicability of the Equal
Treatment directive to sexual orientation discrimination. See Lisa Grant v. South-West Trains,
Ltd., Southampton Indust. Tribunal Case No. C-249/96.
64. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, opinion of advocate general
Tesauro, at 4.
65. Consider the circularity of the requirement in Article 128 that the "Community shall
contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national
and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore."
EU TREATY, supra note 1, art. 128(1). It is quite a task to surmount the oppositions lying just
below the surface of this multi-tasking command.
66. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, opinion of advocate general
Tesauro, at 8.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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IV. NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES CONSIDERED
Cornwall County Council provides a good illustration of my thesis:
the tensions between the whole and its parts are (i) unavoidable (ii) un-
resolvable and (iii) eternal.
Our birthright as social animals is an unquenchable will to or-
der.' We seek connection with others. From connection comes order
and power. It is the way we replicate ourselves in multiple form.
Groups, in this sense are very much like the Borg.7" The curse of our
individuality, disconnected at the most basic level from others, is that
we resist connectivity at the level of the individual and that of the
group. Connectivity implies subordination of the individualism which is
the basis of human life. But individuals come to the text of group
normativity individually.7 That, in itself, ensures that normativity can
never be uniform or immutable.72
69. 1 have explored this in the context of the development of Queer theory and in the craft-
ing of images through which we understand our constitutional principles. See Larry Cats Back-
er, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence,
and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REv. 529 (1996); see also Larry
Catfi Backer, Queering Theory: An Essay on the Conceit of Revolution in Law, in LEGAL
QUEERIES - (Sara Beresford et al., eds. forthcoming 1997).
70. See Star Trek: First Contact (Paramount Pictures 1996). For those who are not fans of
American science fiction television and motion pictures, the Borg were a race which had at-
tained the highest level of communitarian development on a number of levels. Borg society was
composed of humanoid beings who, shortly after birth, were joined with a number of mechani-
cal components. The result was a being part human and part machine, and intimately connected
to all other being in the "collective," the community in which all were expected to function.
Each being thus created became an undifferentiated part of the Borg community. The primary
mission of this collective was assimilative and expansionist. Having derived the perfect state of
being, the Borg felt compelled to spread the message across the galaxy. Their primary function
thus was to seek out other life forms to assimilate them or destroy them. With the Borg we are
presented with an exaggerated version of our own rendering of the nightmare (to some) of an
imperial conformity: near human and machine in perfect integration within each body, the indi-
vidual subsumed within the collective, and a "passive-aggressive" defensive mechanism for
community protection.
71. See Backer, Queering Theory, supra note 69.
72. Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory, supra note 69, at 529
("we practice culture through an endless attempt at replication"). In the context of gender theo-
ry, consider Nancy J. Chodorow, Gender as a Personal and Cultural Construction, 20 SIGNS: J.
OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOc. 516, 517 (1995):
When I claim that gender is inevitably personal as well as cultural, I do not
mean only that people create individualized cultural or linguistic versions of
meaning by drawing upon cultural or linguistic categories at hand. Rather,
perception and meaning are psychologically created. As psychoanalysis docu-
ments, people use available cultural meanings and images, but they experi-
ence them emotionally and through fantasy, as well as in particular interper-
sonal contexts. Individuals thereby create new meanings in terms of their own
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The manifestation of that will to order simultaneously permeates
all human relationships. It is as effective at the level of the personal
and familial as at the level of global interaction. The resistance to every
particular imposed order, emanates as well from this will to order.
Resistance of the individual is the shadow of order through community.
This resistance is expressed through lived experience, the vagaries of
interpretation, or conflict (a militant politics of difference). Thus, our
political systems internalize these tensions without hope of resolution.
Harmonization, subsidiarity and protection of "group" culture rep-
resents a political shorthand for what Jurgen Habermas has identified as
a proceduralist understanding of law.73 Look at the necessary conse-
quences of understanding in our late twentieth century political enter-
prise.
unique biographies and histories of intrapsychic strategies and practices.
Leslye Obiora expressed it well in the context of the "culture" of legal education: "Thus no one
is ever exposed to the totality of a culture; culture is collectively filtered through the particulari-
ties of individual experience. Furthermore, individuals differ in the extent to which they con-
form to norms, and situations differ in the extent to which they elicit conformity." Leslye
Amede Obiora, Neither Here Nor There: Of the Female in American Legal Education, 21 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 355, 385 (1996). Cf. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L.
Rv. 167 (1990).
73. Jurgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 771, 776 (1996). A number
of thoughtful analyses of Habermas' proceduralism can be found in Symposium, Habermas on
Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 767 (1996). As I suggest,
proceduralism works, but only within the framework established by someone-that is, as meta-
process. The contest for the acceptance and construction of meta-process itself reflects the ten-
sions at lower levels. It is in this sense only that I tend to agree with Professor Rosenfeld's
notion of "comprehensive pluralism." Like his comprehensive pluralism, the shorthand of har-
monization, subsidiarity and cultural solicitude form:
a dynamic system that depends on the concurrent work of thrust and
counterthrust which is propelled by the permanent tension generated by the
friction between its negative and positive work... [it] has an important nega-
tive role to play-it can be vital in [the] struggle against the permanent en-
trenchment of any particular set of first order norms .... [It] can also play a
limited, but nonetheless crucial, role on the positive front. By exposing partic-
ular inequities through its leveling mechanisms and by revealing concealed
inequities through the reversal of perspectives, [it] can channel [the] need for
contested first order norms toward more encompassing, widely shared, and
less oppressive alternatives.
Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice be Reconciled Through Discourse Theo-
ry? Reflections on Habermas's Proceduralist Paradigm of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 791, 824
(1996).
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A. Trivialization
Where subnational culture, Member State and Community interests
conflict, only one may prevail. But which? In the area of fundamental
human rights, the answer is the supranational unit."4 Subsidiarity, and
the solicitude for cultural difference, assume a decorative function in
this area when the courts choose to speak. Subsidiarity and cultural
solicitude fall to the individual states during periods of norm genesis
when a "margin of appreciation" acts to restrain system-wide pro-
nouncements of these norms.
In effect, cultural currency is allowed its freedom only at the mar-
gin-as something picturesque because of its difference. Yet, when cul-
tural difference becomes serious and violates Anglo-European notions
of fundamental human and sexual rights, solicitude for difference ends.
Such conduct is not picturesque or tourist worthy. At this point, the
requisites of harmonization will take precedence." Even subsidiarity
has been said to presuppose "a background of shared objectives or
values [necessary] in order to determine what can be regarded as a
'failure' of the lower level entities."
76
But why must assignment to the supranational unit necessarily
follow in a regime now obeisant to the principle of subsidiarity? The
74. Thus, for instance, Jacques Derrida speaks of the need of a duty to shoulder the "Eu-
ropean, and uniquely European, heritage of an idea of democracy" which carries with it a num-
ber of choices and limits on the forms of acceptable cultural norms within political expression.
JACQUES DERRIDA, THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECrIONS ON TODAY'S EUROPE 78-79 (1992).
The practical effect of this decision is not limited to areas such as the rights of "marginalized"
groups, but affects core economic regulation as well. Though outside the scope of this article, I
note, for example, that the fundamental community law principle of privacy underlies the recent
push to develop E.U.-wide regulation of data protection. See Ulrich U. Wuermeling, Harmoni-
zation of European Union Privacy Law, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 414-
415, 419-420 (1996).
75. Consider the issue of female circumcision. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Between Irua and
"Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995); Daliah Setaveh, Women Escaping Genital Mutilation-Seeking
Asylum in the United States, 6 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 123 (1995). Consider also the issue of
the role of females in society. See Crossette, supra note 8.
Where culture is allowed to flower is in the areas of language, national costume (as long
as it is European), music and other essentially charming cultural eccentricities. Much more trou-
blesome are issues of religious practice. Even that can be troublesome in Europe when non-
European cultures attempt an "invasion." Consider the wearing of the hidjab by Muslim women
in France. See Lakeisha S. Townes, French Don't Veil Resentment of Muslim Tradition, TAMPA
TiR., May 5, 1996, at 25. Indeed, Ernesto Laclau has argued that the universalism of Enlight-
enment ideas ought to be embraced as "pragmatic social constructions." ERNESTO LACLAU,
EMANcIPATION(S) 103-104 (1996).
76. See Bernard, supra note 50, at 635.
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answer, I think, is historical as well as political. Europe continues to
suffer the trauma from the consequences of its collective conduct dur-
ing the period 1933-45. Cultural solicitude on a national scale has a
nasty habit of racializing national and religious minorities. Difference
has a way of becoming hubris. Part of Europe's healing process neces-
sarily has had to involve the construction of the belief that difference is
basically cosmetic and that general principles of conduct and outlook
unite all peoples of Europe.' Difference must necessarily be
trivialized. I suspect that this is a healthy course.
B. The Paradox of Process
Privileging harmonization of human rights in a system which re-
quires comity for the advancement of the principles of subsidiarity and
cultural solicitude can weaken the supranational system. Privileging
assimilative supranational systems of human rights is particularly im-
portant where the object of the system, the strongest glue holding the
system together, is the maintenance of a process which must (in order
to succeed) always produce some sort of agreement." If process is the
key to our system of discordant voices, then a system incorporating
multiple voices (but where one voice is the primus inter pares) weakens
the system itself in a number of ways.
First, process can appear to be uncontrolled and devolving into an
exercise of ad hoc politics. With devolution comes the threat of arbi-
trariness as the exercise of process. In the Cornwall County Council
77. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Categories in Comparative Law (manuscript 1996).
Professor Curran's description of the basis for the dmigr6 construction of essentialism and uni-
versalism in comparative law provides a compelling rationale for the same tendencies in the
construction of base-line general principles of Community law:
The 6migr6 comparatists intended the denial of difference to be the theoretical
underpinning of societal and legal tolerance of difference. The 6migrds' per-
sonal experiences led to their faith in the fundamental similarity of all hu-
mans, and to their belief in the perniciousness of according legal recognition
to differences in religious or ethnic origin. Their commitment to a theory of
inclusion did not, however, extend to an inclusion of others' differentiating
attributes, but to a levelling absorption, a homogeneity to be born of erasure
of difference rather than a homogeneity of common genetic background. The
6migr~s' approach is reminiscent of Montaigne's, whose legendary humanism
of inclusion did not necessarily signify a tolerance of difference so much as
an erasure of it through assimilation."
Id., manuscript at 48.
78. The parallel here is to the proceduralist jurisprudence of Herbert Wechsler. Cf. Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 12 (1959);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
1997] HARMONIZATION, SUBSIDIARITY AND CULTURE 209
case that uncontrolled political process can be seen in the power of the
ECJ to read into the Treaty broad powers of hegemony within tradi-
tional modes of cultural behavior.
But by whom is that arbitrary power controlled? Ultimately, it can
be controlled only by the constituent parts of the unity asserting their
own political power within the supranational system. However, the
price of such control can well be instability and the breakup of the
supranational entity itself. Arbitrariness can thus serve not only as the
locus of hegemony, but also as a point of instability in system building.
Second, instability can also follow from the process of unmasking
power. Cornwall County Council unequivocally delineates the real locus
of power within the E.U. system. The blandishments of subsidiarity and
cultural solicitude are window dressing when the supranational institu-
tions confront issues of importance to them. The power of the decision
in Cornwall County Council is the power to normalize and to colonize.
Its pronouncements became the standard of behavior throughout the
Union. As the expected basis of behavior, as the background norm,
such conduct standards replace those which might have otherwise exist-
ed in the Member States. This is a power that means to exclude those
who will not play by the "rules." For those who do not wish to "play"
the only choice is exit.
C. Preserving Artificial Culture
Having unmasked the instability of power at the center, it is also
easy to see the way in which the solicitude of such a centralizing force
for the cultural differences of its constituent parts will destroy the es-
sence of those cultures. We see the solicitude of cultural difference for
what it is-a zookeeper's approach to culture. This approach to culture
contains within it the possibility of what Jurgen Habermas describes as
"administrative preservation" of cultures like forms of endangered species. 9
79. See Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States, 1 EUR. J.
PHIL. 128, 142 (1993). That, certainly is the implication of a cynical reading of Derrida's defi-
nition of the European democratic hegemonic norm as including "respecting differences, idioms,
minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agree-
ment and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism and xenophobia."
DERRIDA, supra note 79, 78-79. In effect we see difference in a cage. It can be given effect
only within the strong containing walls of a hegemonic foundationalism which prevents much
freedom for cultures to be as they may have to be. Where stability and the expression of minor-
ity norms is important, this is a desirable outcome, though hardly the leftist or radical politics
under which these notions are hawked. What we approach here are the notions of toleration
espoused by John Locke read somewhat more generously than in the past. See also John Locke,
A Letter concerning Toleration, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1 (Robert M.
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This approach can be criticized on two grounds: First, the very act
by any dominant group of using its norms to preserve the cultures of
others is an effective means of subordinating the very group which the
dominant group means to preserve. This is the exercise of raw pow-
er-the power to define and the power to regulate. Second, the result-
ing culture will inevitably be an artificial construct of a second or-
der-the artificiality results from the maintenance of cultural norms
from without rather than from the exercise of free cultural practice from
within. Understood properly the temporal expression of culture at any
one time, is what I call popular culture. Popular culture represents
merely an implementation of the possibilities inherent within culture,
not the impossibility of a totality of the possibilities of culture itself.
Anglo-Europeans necessarily practice culture through an endless at-
tempt at replication.' "All the constitutional state can do is make pos-
sible this hermeneutic accomplishment of the cultural reproduction of
lifeworlds. A guarantee of survival would necessarily rob members of
the very freedom to say yes or no that is required today to make cul-
tural heritage one's own and to preserve it.""'
D. Modulating Subordination
In a sense, the notion of contained conflict is built into a system
with the irreconcilable goals of harmonization, subsidiarity and protec-
tion of insular cultures. This is a containment of conscious design-a
metaphorical caging of the dragon that ought not be killed or freed. It
reflects both the mistrust of harmonization, subsidiarity and insularity,
as well as the mistrust of the absence of any of them.82
Hutchins, ed. 1952) (1689).
80. See Backer, Queering Theory, supra note 69, at 32. In this sense, popular culture can
be understood as the "prejudices" (what I would characterize as value choices) of the extant
communal tradition. See also HANS-GEoRG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 302, 306 (Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989). This is the fundamental nature of our
interpretive community. See also Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class?, in Is THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 303-304 (1980); Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Juris-
prudence, 95 Mici. L. REv. 166, 188 (1996) ("'Wle constantly constitute and reconstitute our
tradition, our culture, and our community as we engage in hermeneutic actions. Most important,
this constant reconstitution is always simultaneously constructive and destructive.") (footnotes
omitted).
81. See Habermas, supra note 79, at 142.
82. This is reflected in the recent writing of no less than Jacques Derrida. See DERRIDA,
supra note 74. Derrida argues that while it is important to prevent the severe reconstitution of
centralizing hegemony, it is also important to avoid the multiplication of borders. "It is neces-
sary not to cultivate for their own sake minority difference." Id. at 44.
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This dragon of contained conflict inherent in a system of overlap-
ping power carries negative and positive potentialities. The negatives
include subordination as an independent concept. Subordination is a
negative value in itself. Yet subordination is a necessary component of
human social organization. The necessity for disagreement always
leaves the door open to subordination. Someone's norms will always
have to be the basis for determining what is acceptable and what is not,
and domination is born with the making of that choice. Thus contain-
ment is preferable either freedom or death for the dragon.
There seems to be a level of subordination which most Western
thinkers are not only willing to accept, but insist on imposing on all
cultures. These are what are called basic or human rights. Thus, Jurgen
Habermas notes:
The universalistic content of basic rights is not restricted by the ethical per-
meation of the legal order; rather, it thoroughly penetrates nationally specific
contexts. It is for this reason that the legal neutralization of value conflicts,
which would otherwise fragment the political community, requires that the
justice aspect have a privileged position .... In Germany, for example, the
rights of young Turkish women must, if necessary, be enforced against the
will of fathers who appeal to the prerogatives of their culture of origin. 3
Indeed, no less than Renata Salecl has argued in favor of the imperial-
ism and the necessity of a colonizing spirit built on human rights as
"one of the essential elements of democracy precisely because [it is]
grounded on the idea of the abstract individual."'" The problem is that
even basic or human rights pose severe problems of identification and
interpretation.85 This, of course, is closely tied to the previously con-
sidered consequence of trivialization of difference, or the creation of
limited spheres of acceptable difference.
83. Jurgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 1477, 1498 (1996). Professor Richardson, who would applaud the
breakup of nation-states on principles of self-determination, grounds his notions on the founda-
tions of currently expressed notions of international human rights law. See, e.g., Richardson,
supra note 24, at 61.
84. RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER
THE FALL OF SOCIALISM 119 (1994). On the privileging of human rights concepts, see general-
ly, M. McDOUGAL ET AL., HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PuBuc ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES
OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HuMAN DIGNITy (1980); Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits
of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 523 (1996) (arguing that there is
transcultural moral truth in universal human rights).
85. Consider the views of Islamic thinkers on this point For a thoughtful review of the
relationship of Islam and the enterprise of the global (Western-origin) human rights enterprise,
see David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Ex-
pressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819 (1993) (arguing, in part, that Islam views
public international law as a foreign law to which it must react, and that Islam has set for itself
the task of constructing an alternative (and competitive) vision).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:185
Another negative turns on the potential which always exists for
instability and violence. This is the dragon unleashed-power uncon-
trolled. This is the classical dilemma of the toleration of groups which
advocate the end of toleration.86 At some point, harmonization and
cultural solicitude can reach a point of irreconcilability. At that point,
either the dominated culture will change, or it will go underground. In
the limiting case, sub-cultural groups will exit the union-if they can!
But there are also positives to a system of domesticated
oppositions. Modulation implies ever-shifting patterns of dominance and
subordination. In effect the system provides for the containment of
subordination and dominance. The U.S. achieves the same result
through the patterns of politics inherent in a fluid federal system. 7
Moreover, there is the possibility of shifting centers of power from
the top to the bottom, and then back. The instability of modulating
power through multiple process systems can actually lead to stability if
the modulations can be contained. This, of course is the point made in a
more theoretical vein by Thomas McCarthy."8 It underlies the
postmodern radical politics of Ernesto Laclau."9
86. Many scholars find no easy answer to this. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He
Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal
Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 582 (1993). Others argue that the only groups which may be
permitted entry into the circle of discourse are those which are willing to "play by the rules."
That is the essence of Jurgen Habermas's process based constitutionalism. See, e.g., Habermas,
supra note 79, at 128. It animates Renata Salecl's notion that only certain cultural types ought
to be allowed to "play" at democratic politics (the rest might well be re-educated or excluded).
See SALEcL, supra note 84, at 37 (democracy must create a space in which democracy will
become self-perpetuating, where the anti-democratic will have no real effect). Bill Bowring has
documented the problems of the normalization of subnational cultures which might not be will-
ing to play by the "rules" in his study of the Crimean Tatars. See Bill Bowring, Minority Rights
and the Problem of Nationalism: Is there a European Solution? (Sept. 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Bowring correctly observes, at the conclusion of his piece, that
"Difference, the Other, is to be recognized and respected, but must not, says Derrida, be culti-
vated for its own sake. But that may well not be the perspective of the Other herself." Id., at
14.
87. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 403-48 (1994).
88. See, e.g., Thomas McCarthy, Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Ana-
lytical Distinctions, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083 (1996). "Practical rationality in the face of
diversity is as much a matter of recognizing, respecting, and accommodating differences as one
of transcending them. Arrangements shaped by the former concern are no less practically ratio-
nal than those shaped by the later, and just political arrangements will normally be shaped by
both, as well as by negotiation and compromise." Id. at 1124.
89. Laclau has argued that solicitude for minority culture can occur only within the frame-
work of a traditional territorially based nation-state of the Western European model. See
LACLAU, supra note 75, at 28-29. Any other model, that is, any model built on closure, poses
severe problems for democratic notions and perhaps even for fundamental rights. See id. At
least in the context of African "nation-states," this notion has been vigorously contested. See,
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The danger of contained conflict is its inherent instability. As a
Biblical people, our theology is based on notions of equilibrium and
stasis. To deliberately support a system based on controlled instability
may well be beyond us. Most supranational federative institutions have
not deliberately confronted both the dangers and the possibilities in the
creation and maintenance of complex political systems. Yet, to order
complex inter-individual and intergroup relationships under the rubric
of multigroup representative democracy will require a strong-willed de-
termination to embrace and control instability. Subsidiarity and cultural
solicitude contribute to that necessary instability. To that extent, sys-
tems without these opposing forces sink into routinized mindless tradi-
tionalism and a barbarism with which Europe is all to well acquainted.
V. NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES ILLUSTRATED
The necessary oppositions of harmonization and subsidiarity and
cultural solicitude are not just a function of judicial law making gone
wild. Nor does this trio exit merely for the benefit of the European
Union. The multiple dominances inherent in these oppositions also exist
within the "federative" structures of international law.
Keith Aoki considered the perversity of harmonization from "the
other side."' He described how in a world of unequal power, harmo-
nization of concepts of ownership through international bodies provides
a vehicle for the imposition of the norms of dominant states on those
with less power. Indeed, in this sense, harmonization can be considered
the ultimate act of subordination.
This creates its own perversities. Taken to its limit, the notion of
harmonization itself can be understood only as an instrument of subor-
dination: of a territoriality which accords with power relationship norms
of a powerful Euro-American civilization. Implicit in Professor Aoki's
argument is the idea expressed by Professor Richardson, who citing
Professor Falk's work on the necessity to evolve notions of sovereign-
ty,91 argued that it is time for the "state to step back, in myth and
practice, render itself amenable to, for example, multiple sovereignties,
and grasp the integrative opportunities in the modern international com-
munity in order to remain viable."92
e.g., Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995); William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back Into Africa,
74 FOREIGN AFF. J. 1 (1995) (arguing that as African states have failed with tragic human
consequences, Europe must reassert suzerainty to aid development).
90. Keith Aoki, Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Author-
ship, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1299 n.8 (1996).
91. See, e.g., RicHARD FALK, EXPLORATION AT THE EDGE OF TIME: THE PROSPECT FOR
WoRLD ORDER (1992).
92. Richardson, supra note 24, at 49. Professor Richardson here cites RICHARD FALK, supra
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The implication, for those who find subordination of any type
uncomfortable may be that the project of harmonization must be aban-
doned to avoid the trap of subordination. This requires, as Henry Rich-
ardson intimates, the abandonment of the notion of the political nation-
state and of norm-imposing international bodies.93 Yet, it is also true
that Professor Richardson does not follow the implications of his argu-
ment to their logical end. There is a strong sense in the work for need
to preserve and perhaps even expand a necessarily hegemonic and norm
imposing system of human rights policed by some sort of world order.
However, it is hard to reconcile the notion of a necessary hegemo-
ny with the idea that "people ought to be free." What we are doing here
is picking and choosing. Once we begin down that road we are back
where we started. Who gets to pick and choose and what they pick and
choose is matter of power--dominance and hegemony, and the resulting
subordination will surely follow. I have suggested that the inevitability
of dissent is regulated in two ways within the normative framework of
the principles of harmonization, subsidiarity and cultural solicitude:
when dissent is characterized as benign (not contradicting the core
norm) it may be permitted; where dissent expresses fundamental dis-
agreement with the normative structure, it will be suppressed. We sup-
press disequal treatment of women within Europe and the United States.
Saudi Arabians might suggest that disequal treatment of women works
to the benefit of women by providing them a space within which they
can reach their full potential free of the harassing possibilities of con-
tact with men.94 There is no way to kill or free the dragon. Contained
subordination in an unstable state is the most free we can hope to be.
Yet this is likely an impossible state to maintain for long.
Professors Aoki and Richardson have each explored the way the
tensions I have described have made their imprint on the relations be-
tween social/cultural/political wholes and the sum of its parts. In each
case, the oppositions of the theoretical constructs-harmonization,
note 91, at 204-205. See also Richard Falk, The Pathways of Global Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTrrTUnONAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE 13, 25-27 (Richard Falk et a. eds. 1993).
93. See Richardson, supra note 24. Bronislaw Geremek has also suggested that the "grow-
ing pressures and demands of supranational integration have given rise to a degree of uncer-
tainty as to the fate of the nation-state." BRONiSLAW GEREMEK, THE COMMON ROOTS OF Eu-
ROPE 162 (Jan Aleksandrowicz et al. trans. 1996). Yet he goes on to make a case for the pres-
ervation of the cultural state (rather than the political state), arguing that rejecting nationhood as
a cultural construct frees people to manipulate the idea of nationhood to develop the social and
political state and may thus possibly inhibit integration. "But in the model of the nation-state
which has become the common property of Europe, the state is tempered and restricted by the
'sovereignty of the people,' and in the interplay between aspirations and realities, one can dis-
cem not only conflicts of interest but also feelings of brotherhood and solidarity." Id. at 184.
94. See, e.g., Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate, 17 HUM. RTS.
Q. 587, 596-97 (1995).
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subsidiarity and cultural solicitude-produce theoretically perverse
results. However, in practical terms, they reflect a reasonable practical
resolution. The opposition of the three represent a balancing of compet-
ing needs in a world in which power is not shared equally-a world in
which power must be expressed and to which actions must defer.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the end there is only domination and subordination. We must
accept the fact that as long as we insist on grouping ourselves in multi-
ple joinings with others on the basis of any differentiating set of crite-
ria, we will have created the environment in which domination and
subordination, hegemony and colonization, will exist.
The law of the state and international law must remain ever aware
of this reality. Its purpose must be to contain the possibilities of he-
gemony and subordination. To that end, every system of supranational
organization, every system of international law must be grounded on
the understanding that it will create a hegemony defined by the core
rules its ordering will represent." At the same time, the participants in
these organizations must remain vigilant that the hegemony created
remains rooted in minimalism and in ever-evolving common notions of
justice. Such interlocking systems must remain ever committed to test-
ing and retesting the normative legitimacy of contemporary law.'
We have chosen our hegemonic basis within the Euro-American
world-fundamental process and human rights.' In this sense, Europe
95. This is now becoming more clearly understood within the concept of subsidiarity, and
especially the relationship between the downward pressure of subsidiarity and the necessarily
supranational task of defining the general principles within which subsidiarity principles (in-
cluding the principle of cultural solicitude) may operate.
Although subsidiarity is often represented and perceived as a way to protect
local values against interference by higher level entities, it in fact presupposes
that common values are shared between central and local institutions in
spheres of concurrent competencies. Subsidiarity is concerned with the means
of furthering those values but cannot provide a way out of fundamental con-
flicts about the values themselves. It is an inherent limit of the principle that
it relies on the basic assumption that individuals will act in pursuance of the
common good. If there is no common good, in the sense that there is pro-
found disagreement as to what the common good requires, subsidiarity will
provide no solution to the problem. The definition of common values and ob-
jectives has to logically precede any application of the principle of
subsidiarity.
Bernard, supra note 50, at 651-52.
96. The process, of course, is conscious and unconscious; it is a process at once internal-
ized in politics and outside of it; it remains a process rooted in individual action and group con-
formity. These notions are developed in Backer, Queering Theory, supra note 69.
97. See generally MCDouGAL ET. AL., supra note 84. As Richard Lillich has noted in an-
other context
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especially, is the child of the left, "which has always felt an affinity for
another kind of liberalism, a liberalism based in values that are to serve
as regulative ideals so that actions are never only formal procedures or
substantive decisions."98 The imposition of a set of regulative ideals
necessarily subordinates alternative models. They must. The suppression
of competing models is good as and to the extent that the normative
legitimacy of the ideals actually chosen cannot be challenged."
Supranational entities will adopt and impose fundamental principles
on its subordinate units. In the European Union, as the Cornwall Coun-
ty Council court so eloquently put it, the "principle of equality, which
is one of the fundamental principles of Community law" is a "funda-
mental human right whose observance the Court has a duty to en-
sure.""0 . This duty requires the making of a "courageous deci-
sion"-courageous because harmony here is an act of aggression, per-
haps a necessary one, the object of which is to flatten the contours of
state idiosyncracy otherwise possible within the principle of
The need for normative consistency is a very important one. If international
human rights law is indeed universal (the "mantra" of the international com-
munity most recently reiterated in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action), then not only must the UN treaty bodies be expected
to interpret and apply the identical or essentially similar human rights norms
and standards found in their respective treaties uniformly, but they and the
regional human rights treaty bodies must be aware of and sensitive to each
other's jurisprudence as well.
Lillich, supra note 60, at 701. Professor Lillich recounts how, "in the Bloemfontein Statement,
senior judicial figures from the Commonwealth and the United States joined judges and jurists
from South Africa to affirm 'the importance of both international human rights instruments and
international and comparative case law as essential points of reference for the interpretation of
national constitutions and legislation and the development of the common law."' Id. at 700.
98. Gabriel Motzkin, Habermas's Ideal Paradigm of Law, 17 CARDoZO L. REV. 1431, 1439
(1996). That "other kind of liberalism" mentioned in the quote refers to the "economic compo-
nent of liberalism," id, with which the classic right has tended to ally and the classic left has
tended to war.
99. Of course, here is the rub, since the question inevitably arises-challenged by whom?
Every normative framework will generate dissenters-no matter how good the framers convince
themselves the normative framework may be. This applies between those who have agreed that
such a system ought to apply, see e.g., Fundamental Rights and Common European Values, 33
COMMON MKT. L. R~v. 215 (1996). It also applies, perhaps with even more force, as between
peoples who do not share even the basic framework from which to distill a common frame-
work. That, certainly, is the point that is made in a fairly jingoistic way in MOHAMMAD &
ISHIHARA, supra note 7. See also Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights De-
bate, 17 HuM. RTs. Q. 587, 595-601 (1995) (discussing the ways in which Western notions of
human rights and "Islamic normative requirements" conflict, and particularly with respect to the
legal status of women, restrictions on religious liberty and corporal punishment).
100. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996), at 1 18,
19.
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subsidiarity, as well as muting the possibility of the "flowering of the
cultures of the Member States." 10'
Thus, we leave our three voices. Although the European Union,
like other supranational organizations, loudly announces its adherence
to the principles of diversity and respect for difference, although it
celebrates the locality in theory, the facts are necessarily otherwise.
Difference is celebrated, but only as long as it sings to the tone dictated
by the voice of harmony. Harmony within groups is the first meta-prin-
ciple. All else is simply dressing. Culturally respected dressing com-
prised of national costume, language, cooking style, holidays, art, music
is celebrated as significant difference. Further departures from the cen-
tralizing idea is suppressed for the preservation of the group. Uncon-
trolled difference has meant annihilation in Europe. Still, beyond the
suppression of violation of core norms, there is the possibility of toler-
ation, accommodation, mutual respect, and multiculturalism.
Subsidiarity, deference and cultural solicitude can only exist within this
box. Yet within the box, much is possible.
101. EU TREATY, supra note 1, art. 128.

